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Abstract

mlllti-party computation
compnt.ation (SJ\lC)
(ShIC) model
illode1 provitles
ineails for l~alailciilg
The secure multi-party
provides means
balancing the use
Iilcreasiilg security
security concerns
coilcerils have
11al.e led to a surge in
and confidentiality
confidentiality of distributed
distribut.ed data.
data. Increasing
onl~' proveil
provell
work on
oil practical secure
secure multi-party
1nult.i-party computation
coinputatioil protocols. However,
However. most
inost are only
secure ullder
under the semi-honest
semi-hoilest model,
model, and security under this adversary model
illode1 is insufficiellt
iils~~fici~iit
secure
for
illost applications. In
I11 this paper:
no\rel framework:
frame~vork:accountable
accoui~tal~le
coinputi~ig(AC)
(XC)
most
paper, we propose a novel
computillg
framework. which
~17llicllis sufficient
sufficient or practical for many
man!- applications
applic.ations withOllt
\vitlioiit the complexity
coinplesit,y and
framework,
cost of a Sl\lC-protocol
applicabilit~· of
ShIC-protocol under the malicious model.
model. Furthermore,
F~lrtherinore.to show
s h o ~the
tlie a~)plical~ilit~the
pri\"ac~'-preserving
t.1le AC-framework,
AC-framework. we present an application
applicatioil under this framework
framework regarding PI-i\-acy-preser\.iilg
mining
illillillg frequent itemsets..
it,emset,s..
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Introduction

Privacj- and security,
securit.y, particularly maintaining
inaintaining confidentiality of data,
data, have become a challenging
Privacy
issue with
The
wit 11 advances in information
inforination and communication
coininunicat.ion technology.
tec1~i~olog.y.
T h e ability to
t o communicate
coininunicat~eand
dat,a has many
inany benefits. The
T h e idea of an omniscient
oinniscient data
dat,a source carries
ca.rries gteat
gfeat value to
t,o research
share data
disseinination. Witnessing
Mjit.nessing the
t,lle cost of duplicated
duplicat,ed medical tests or the damage
darnage from errors
and data dissemination.
result.ing from
froin incomplete
incoinp1et.e or incorrect information,
informat,ion, such a data source could substantially reduce
resulting
waste and inefficiency.
t.he other
ot.her hand,
hand: an omniscient
omniscient. data source eases misuse,
misuse: such as the
t.he growing
gron-ing problein
On the
problem of
identity
iclent.it.~itheft.
t,l~eft.To prevent misuse
inisuse of data,
data; there is a recent surge in lmvs
laws mandating
inanda.t.ing protection
prot.ection of
confident.ia1 data,
dat,a;such as the
t.he European Community
Coinmunit,y privacy standards [5],
[5].U.S.
U.S. healthcare
llealt hcare laws
la.~vs[11],
[ll];
confidential
California. SB1386.
SB1386. However,
Ho\vever, this
t,llis prot.ect.ion
coines with
wit.11 a real cost through bot.11
securit.y
and California
protection comes
both added security
expendit.ure and penalties and costs
c0st.s associated
associat.ed with
wit.11 disclosure. For example, CardSystems
CardSyst.eins was
~7as
expenditure
terminated
terininat.ed by Visa and American
Ainerican Express after
aft.er having credit card information
infbrinat.ion stolen.
st.olen. ChoicePoint
Cl~oicePoint
st,ock lost
lost. 20% of its
it.s value in the month
inontl~following
follo~vingtheir
t.lleir disclosure of information
inforination theft.
t.heft. Such public
stock
enorinous and could poteilt,ially
Fi-om lessons
lessoils learned in
relations costs can be enormous
potentially kill a company. From
pract.ice,
what. we need is the ability to compute
coinpute the desired "beneficial outcome"
out.coine" of data
data. sharing
practice, what
without. having to
t.o actually
act,ually share or disclose data.
dat.a.. \'Ve
We can maintain
inaint,ain the
t.he security provided by
without
separation of control
cont.ro1 while still
st,ill obtaining the benefits of a global data
dat.a source.
source.
Secure multi-party
mu1t.i-part.y computation
roinput,at,iorl (Sl\IC)
(SAIC) [8,
[8: 19,
19: 20]
201 has recently
recent,ly emerged as an answer
ansm:er to
t.o this
t.his
problem. Informally,
Informally, if a protocol meets
ineets the
t,he Sl\IC
Sh4C definitions,
definitions, the
t,he part,icipat,ing
inere
participating part.ies
parties learn mere
t.he final result and whatever
n:hat.ever can be inferred
iilferrcd from
froin the
t . 1 final
~
o ~ c ninputs. A simple
the
result and their own
example is Yao's millionaire problein
problem [19]:
[19]: two
t,wo millionaires
inillionaires want to learn who
\vho is richer without
wit.hout

1

act,ual wealth
wealt.11 to
t.o each other.
ot.l~er.Recognizing this,
t,llis, the research community has developed
disclosing their actual
many
protocols, for applications
inally Sl\/IC
SMC prot.ocols,
applicat.ions as diverse as forecasting
forecast.ing [3].
[3].data analysis
anal!-sis [12]
[12] and auctions
[14]
[14].'.1
Formal
Forinal definitions
definit,ions of SMC
ShdC exist for two adversary models: semi-honest and malicious.
malicious. In
I11 the
semi-honest
party follows
protocol. However.
protocol
semi-honest, model,
model, it
it, is assumed that
t.11at.each part,y
follows the
t.he prot.0~01.
Ho\ve\:cr. after
aft.er the
t.he prot.0~01
t , l ~ eadversary may attempt
att.einpt, to
t.o compute additional
adclitional information
i~iforinationfrom the
t , l ~ emessages
inessages
is complete, the
party can diverge
received during execution.
execut,ion. In
I11 the
t.he malicious
inalicious model, a part?di\-crge arbitrarily
arbit.rari1:. from
froin normal
norinal
t.he prot.0~01.
It, has been proven that for any
aay pol!;nomial
algorithm, there exists
execution of the
protocol. It
polynomial time algorithm,
t i n e secure prot,ocol
t,l~at.
t.he same functionality
funct.ionalit!. under
liilder either
eit,l~erthe semi-honest
semi-1lonest
a polyilo~nial
polynomial time
protocol that
achieves the
or the
Nevertheless, most pract,ical
practical algorithms
developed have only been proveil
proven
t.he malicious
inalicious model
inodel [8].
[8].Nevert.l~eless,
algorit.l~ins
secure under the semi-honest model.
\\Thile
not
a
proof,
this
certainly
gives
evidence
that
achieving
model. While
a
gi\,es
security against a malicious
inalicious adversary adds significant
significailt complexity and expense.
ShlC-protocol secure under the semi-honest model
inodel (or a SS31C-protocol)
A SMC-protocol
SS~\IC-protocol) rarely pro\~ides
provides
example. two
t\vo competing
coinpeting transportation
trailsport at ion companies
conipanies
sufficient security for practical applications. For example,
want to know if they can collaborate to achieve
acllieve better efficiency
cfficienc;\.and consequentlv
coiisequentl\~reduce operational
SShJC-protocol that searches for possible overlap of the two companies'
costs. Assume there exists a SSMC-protocol
trucking routes. It is difficult to
protocol because it is
t.o convince the companies to utilize the prot,ocol
uilacceptable to
t o assume that
that, two
t.wo competing
colnpet,ing companies trust
t.rust,each other to follow
follo~vthe
t.he prot.0~01.
unacceptable
protocol. On
hand, if one company can guarantee
guarant,ee the other companv
coinpan>sthat
t.llat it has
llas behaved honestly
llonestl~~
t.he other
ot.ller hand,
the
st.ep of the
t.he protocol,
during each execution step
protocol, then a collaboration bet\~:een
between the two part.ies
parties becomes
possible. A SMC-protocol secure under the malicious
inalicious model (or a l\ISMC-protocol)
AIShIC-prot,ocol) generally
t.he complexity
comp1exit.y of a IVISI'vlC-protocol
h4SMC-protocol commonly prevents it from
froin
provides such a guarantee, but the
practice.
being adopted in pract,ice.
Imagine
parties authorized to
scenario: multiple pa.rt.ies
t,o see each other's data want
\milt. to
t.o compute
coinput,e
Iinagiile another scenario:
result; nevertheless,
nevert,heless, open disclosure of the
t.he data
dat.a to
t o non-participating
11011-pal-ticipatillgpart.ies
a shared result;
parties is prol1ibit.ed.
prohibited.
In
party finds that its best interest
disclosiilg the data,
data. every partv
I11 order to avoid the cost or liability from disclosing
follow a protocol secure under the semi-honest mode.J.
inodd. \Vhat
\T-liat happens if data is disclosed?
is to follow
follo\ved the
Clearly it is the fault of the original owner of the data provided that other parties followed
protocol. On the other hand,
hand. since a party may have beha\-ed
dishonestl;\~.the owner can accuse
behaved dishonestly,
sholild be shared. At this point.
otllei party would like to prove
others and claim that liability should
point, the other
follo~vthe protocol and consequently show
sllo\v that the~'
the!- could not have seen the data
that they did follow
disllonestly). The
T h e scenario leads us
11s to a new framework:
framework: accountable
(unless the owner had behaved dishonestly).
(unless
coinputiilg (AC).
(AC).
computing
T h e idea behind the AC-framework is that a party who
~ v h ocorrectly followed
follo\ved the protocol can
call be
The
consequent,ly prove that
t.hat someone else must
inlist have improperly disclosed
proven to have done so and consequently
dat,a. This provides substantial
subst,ailt,ial practical utility
ut.ility over a semi-honest
semi-lionest protocol. In
I11 addition,
a.ddit,ion,although
data.
t.l~ingsthat
t.hat. they should not
not. and
inalicious adversary part,icipat.ing
a malicious
participating in an AC-protocol may learn things
detect.ed under the
t,he AC-frame,vork.
AC-framework. Furthermore,
damage the result, such a behavior could be detected
t,lle AC-framework
AC-fi-aine\voi-k does not need to
t.o prevent,
t.o a malicious
inalicious adversary,
a.dversary, prot.ocols
since the
prevent disclosure to
protocols
complex. In
I11 part,icular,
inucll of the
t.he cost
cost, can
call be pushed to
t.o a verification
verificat.ion phase which
\vhich
call be less complex.
can
particular, much
oilly be run to
t o expose the culprit when
\vhen disclosure is detected.
detect.ed. This enables prot.ocols
protocols that
needs only
t.hat
t.o many practical applications
applicatioils for which
approach the efficiency of semi-honest protocols and leads to
the
insufficient..
t.he semi-honest protocols are insufficient.
The
T h e goal of this paper is to introduce and analyze the AC-framework
AC-fi-aine~vorkas ,veIl
well as to demonstrate
deinonstrate
I'We
'\\'e have
h a l e only cited one early
ea~l\-example
e x a m p l e of each.
each
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Sectioil 2 preseilt,s
froin the
t,he literature
lit.erat(u1.eof secure multiinultiits pract.ica,lity.
practicality. Section
presents current state of the art from
int.roduces the framework and provides guidelines for designing an
party computation.
part,?
computat,ion. Section
Sect.ion 3 introduces
AC-protocol.
and
AC-prot,ocol. Section
Sect,ion 4 illustrates
illust.rat,es the
t.lie feasibility
feasil>ilit~an(] applicability of the frame\vork
fra11ien:ol.k in the
tlle field of
privacy-preserving data
dat.a mining. Finally,
Finall!.. section 55 concludes the
t.he paper.

2

Related Work // Background

We first give a description
descriptioil and definitions
defi~litionsof Secure l'dultiparty
Xlultiparty Computation:
Computation: these are necessary
VYe
to understand
uilderstaild the rest of the
tlle paper. \Ve
IYe then discuss two proposed ideas that appear similar to
our proposed AC-framework,
AC-fraine\~ork.and highlight
highligllt the differences.

2.1

Secure Multi-party Computation

Yao first postulated the
t.lie two-party
t.uio- part.^^ comparison problem (Yao's
(Yao's J\Iillionaire
hlillionaire Protocol)
Prot.0~01)and developed
sollit ion [20].
[20]. This was extended
est encied to multiparty
multipa,rty computations
coinput at i o ~ ~
bys Goldreich et
a provably secure solution
al.
[8].
They
developed
a
framework
for
secure
multiparty
computation,
and
in
[9]
[8].
secl~re
1nult.iparty
[9] proved that
t.hat.
al.
coinput,iilg a function privat.ely
equi~alentto computing
coinput,ing it securely.
computing
privately is equivalent
\Ve
party (also
We start
st.art. with
\vit,h the definitions
definit,ions for securi(v
security in the
tlle semi-honest
semi-11onest model.
inodel. A serni-honest
semi-honest, part.y
(also
referred to
as
honest
but
curious)
follows
the
rules
of
the
protocol
using
its
correct
input,
but
is
follo~vstllc rnles
t,he
correct, input..
to
but.
free
free to
t.o later use what
\vhat it
it. sees during execution
execut.ion of the protocol to
t.o compromise
co~nproinisesecurity.
A formal definition
private two-party
defiilitioil of privat,e
t,n:o-party computation
coinpl~tatioilin the
t.he semi-honest
semi-honest. model
inodel is given below.

-

Definition 11 Let ff:: {O,l}*
functionality; and
(0; I}* x {O,l}*
(0. I}* f-------4 {O,l}*
(0. I}* x {O,l}*
(0. I}* be a functionality,
a.nd h(x,y)
f l ( x : y ) (resp.,
(resp.,
12(x,y))
first (resp.,
f2(x: y)) denote the ,first
(resp., second)
second) element of
of ff(x,y).
(x. y ) . Let II
II be two-party protocol for comfirst (resp.,
puting ff.. The view of
of the ,first
(resp., second) party during an execution of
of II
II on (x,y);
(x. y), denoted
VIEW: (x,y)
( x . y) (resp.,
(resp.; VIE\""~(x,y));
(x; y)): is (x.r,7TI1,
(x. 1-; m l . ....
. . . . Tnt)
nrt) (resp.,
(resp., (y,r,7TI1,
(y. 1-: nxl.....
. . .,Tnt));
n ~ , ) ) where
,.
repreVIEW?
rr repreth
first (resp.,
(resp., second) party's internal
in.terna1 coin tosses;
tosses, and rHi
n x i represents the
th.e iith
sents the outcome of
of the .first
message it has received.
received. The OUTPUT
O ~ J T P C Tof the .first
,first (resp.,
(resp.. second)
second) party during an
an, execution of
of II
II
on
(x,y))
on, (x,y);
(x: y), denoted OUTPUT?
OUTPUT: (x,y)
(x: y) (resp.,
(resp., oOUTPUT~
c~i>u~
(x:
Yy)) is implicit in the party's own view of
of the
execution: and OUTPUT
O L T T P UDT (x,
(x;
~ y) =
= (OUTPUT!l (T,
(:r,y) ,OUTPUT~
.
(x. yy)).
)).
execution,
(T.
(general case)
polynomial-time
case) We say that II
II privately computes ff if
if there exist probabilistic polyn.omia1-time
algorithms: denoted 51
S1 and 52;
S2,such that
algorithms;

VIEWY

OUTPUT:^

OUTPUT^

,c
C

{(SI (T.
(x. fr
f I (T,
(x. V))
3 ) ) ,f
. f (T,
(x. y))},
= {(VIEW?
{ ( \ ~ n . :(x.
(x. y)
y) . OUTPUT
OUTPUT^D (T,
(x. y))}
{(51
y))} x,y ==
y))} xx.yY
C
C

D
{(52
y))) ),. f (x,
y))}
{(VIEW~ (T,
y))) })x.y
{ ( S 2 (y,
(3. 12
f 2 (T,
(2.Y
(x. Y
) ) }x,y
, . ~==
= ((v1~n-Y
(x. 3y)) ,. OUTPUT
0 u T p u T n (T,
(2. Y
}~

cL

where = denotes computational
polynomial-size
computation,al indistinguishability
indistin.gu.ishabl:lity by (non-uniform)
(n.on-un.iform) families of
of polynom.ia1-size
circuits.
circuits.

T h e above definition says that a computation
co~nputationis secure if the
tlle view
vie\?: of each partv
The
party during the
effect~velysimulated given the input and the output of that party.
execution of the protocol can be effectively
This model
1~110correctly
correctlv follow
follo\v the protocol do not have to
t o fear seeing
inodel guarantees that parties who
d a t a they are not supposed to.
data
T h e malicious model
inodel (guaranteeing
(guaranteeing that a malicious
inalicious partv
infor~nation
The
party cannot obtain private information
hoilest one,
one. among
ainoilg other things) adds considerable
coilsiderable complexity due to the fact that the
froin an honest
from
consistency of every step of execution with
\i-ith previous computations
coinputations generally needs to be verified.

3

\171iile we do not give the full definition here,
here. we note t.hat
that there are three things
tlliilgs the model
inodel cannot
'Vhile
llandle [9]:
[9]:
handle
1. Parties refusing to
t.o participate in the
t,he prot,ocol;
1.
protocol,

2. Parties using other (valid)
(valid) input in place of their act.ual
actual data,
data, and
2.

3. Part.ies
Partics aborting t.he
the protocol prematurely.
3.
\?;hile many
inany of the
t,he existing
exist.ing pract.ica1
SMC-st.yle protocols do provide guarantees beyond that
"'hile
practical S:MC-style
t.lie semi-honest
semi-honest, model
inodel (such
(snch as guaranteeing
guaranteeiilg that
t.l~at,individual data it.ems
items are not disclosed to
to a
of the
n~aliciousparty),
part.^^), few meet all the
t.he requirements
rcquire1nent.s of the malicious
inalicious model.
inodel.
malicious

2.2

Other Verification-based Methods

Ideas proposed in [2,
presented in this paper. However, both of
12; 6]
61 appear similar to what we have present.ed
of
sit.ua.tion where
wllcre verifications
\rerifications are mandat.ory
inandatory and performed on the fly.
fly. This will
them focus on the sit.uat.ion
become clear after we detail
det,ail t.he
t.hc AC-framework.
AC-fraine\vork. Another
Anot.her key distinction
dist.inct,ion is that.
that our AC-framework
call achieve a practical
(in cases where there
t,llere is no reason
reasoil to
t.o suspect
suspect. malicious
inalicious behavior)
can
pmctical efficiency (in
not achievable by previous methods.
t.he framework prescntcd
[2] adopts
ad0pt.s a game-t.heoretic
game-t.11eoreticapproach in that participates
addition, the
In addition,
presented in [2]
are
information.
arc rational,
rat,ional, and using an auditing
audit.ing device periodically are expected to provide truthful
t,rut,l~ful
information.

3

The AC-Framework

I11 this section,
sect.ion, we int.roduce
int.roduce the accountable
accouiltable computing
coinput.ing (AC)
(AC) framework.
franie\vork. Before presenting details,
details,
In
first, clarify the following
followiilg terminologies:
t.erminologies:
we first
SSAlC-prot.0~01:a prot.0~01
t.he semi-honest
semi-honest. model
inodel 111
in the literature
literat,ure of secure
protocol secure under the
• SSJ\lC-prot.ocol:
mu1t.i-party computation
coinputat ion (ShlC);
multi-party
(S~lC):
AlShlC-prot.0~01:a prot.0~01
t,he malicious
inalicious model
inodel under the
t.he context
cont.ext. of SMC:
SMC;
• J\lSI\lC-protocol:
protocol secure under the
represe11t.s a prot.0~01
• AC-protocol: represents
protocol secure in the proposed AC-framework.
I11 addition
addit.ion to t.he
t.he above terminologies,
t.erininologies, the terms
t.erins honest and semi-hon,est
In
semi-honest are interchangeable for
the rest of the paper.
@ is a protocol satisfying
sat,isfyiilg all the requirements
requireillents under t.he
the AC-framework. In
I11 general, t.he
the
Suppose <I>
ineails to
t.o prove what it has done during the execution
executioil
AC-framework provides a participat.iiig
participatin·g part.y
party means
@ is consistent.
consist,ent. with honest bel~aviors
(expect.ed under the
t.he semi-honest
semi-llonest model).
inodel). For inst.ance,
inst.ance,
of <I>
behaviors (expected
whet.11er or not
not. a party has followed
followed t.he
the prescribed execution
executioil procedures of a protocol could be
whet.her
inodel. FOl'
For the rest of the chapter,
chapter; we first
first. present essent.ial
essential definitions related t.o
t.o
proved in the model.
AC-framework. We conclude the section
sect.ion by differentiating
differentiat.ing t.he
the AC-framework from t.he
the SMC
the AC-framework.
inodel.
model.

(Accountable Behavior)
Behavior) Given
Given a protocol <I>
@ under the AC-framework,
acDefinition 2 (Accountable
AC-fmmework, an acbehave, and it has two related
coun,table behavior rrOxo
countable
ox [3 specifies how participatin,g
participating parties should behave,
components
com.pon,en,tsQ,
a , (3:
P:

4

V e r i f i e r 0'
cr E
E {Participating-party,
{Participating-party. Third-party}:
Third-party): an
on entity
en,tity who oversees and validates
vulidates the
• Verifier
verification
participating-party indicates
veri,fication process, where participatin.g-party
indicate.^ the validation
~:ulidationof
of the verification
zlerlficution protliird-purty ind'icates
i7adicates the validation
va,lidation,
cess is supervised
supervised by a participating
participating party or parties:
parties, and third-party
party (i.e.,
government agency,
is supervised
supervised by a third party
(i.e.: a court,
court, a govern,m.en.t
a.,qency: etc)
etc)..
• Degree of
specifies what information
of disclosure (3:
P: speci,fies
inform,ution can be disclosed during the verification
veri,fication
process.
According to the above definition,
be interpreted
definit,ion, if 0'
cr == Participating-party,
Pal-ticipat,ing-part,?. rT 0Ox3
x 3 can he
int.erpreted as:
as: an
account,able) behavior can
call be verified among part,icipating
t.he information
expected (or accountable)
participating part,ies,
parties, and the
disclosed during the verification
verificat,ion process must be consistent with
\vit,ll 8.
d.
For practical purpose.
purpose, we have classified the
participating-party
t,he verifiers into
iiito two categories:
categories: part,icipating-party
T h e AC-framework
AC-frainework allows
allo~vsa part,icipating
and third-party. The
participating ]?art.!?
party to he
be the verifier so that a well
established or reputable
reput.ahle party has the
t,lle opportunity
opport.unit,yto
t.o evaluate if its first-time
first-time collaborator is trustt.rust,wort,hy. On the other
obher hand,
hand. a relatively
relat,ively unknown
unkno\vn part,?
11avethe chance
cllance to prove its credibility
worthy.
party can have
to the other collaborating
party under the
party can
collaboratiilg partry
t,lie proviso that the
tlie other
othei part.!?
call be trusted
t,rusted based on its
ot,ller reputations. Thus,
Thus: the
t.he verification PI"OCCSS
pi.occss could serve as a mechanism
well-known image or other
trust, among
ainoilg participat,ing
in building trust
participating parties and reduce costs in establishing well-purposed colI11 case there
t.here is a dispute
disput.e among part.icipating
tlie verification
verificat.ion process must he
laboration. In
participating pai.t,ies:
parties, the
be
coilduct,ed under the supervision of a third entity
ei1t.it.yso that
t,hat any niaJicious
malicious part.y
conducted
party can be held accountI11 addition, a random
raildoin verification
verificat.ion can be performed as a spot check to
t.o audit the
t,lle integrity
integrit,y of
able. In
able.
parties.
participating part.ies.
Degree of disclosure only applies to the verification
process. The benefibs
benefits of proviilg
proving innocence
verificatioil process.
iilnoceilce
concerns, or only take place in a trusted
t.rust.ed environment
en\7iroinnent (e.g.,
(e.g., a courtl"Oom.)
court,i-oom.)
may outweigh privacy concerns,
This component
participating part,ies
parties to
component. allows
allo\vs part,icipat.ing
t o decide what
what. is more important.
iinport.ant,. If
If the
t.he verifier is
trusted, such as a court,
court,, disclosure of privat,e
inforinat.ion to
t o the court may not be a problenl
trusted,
private information
problem during
what. can
call be disclosed during the
tlie verification
verificat,ion process must be agreed
the verification process. Also, what
participating parties before the
on by all relevant participat,ing
t,he exe'cution
execution of any AC-protocol.
AC-prot.oco1.
Next we define conditions
condit,ions that
that. a protocol needs to
t,o guarantee
gnarantee in the AC-framework.
AC-frainexvork.

(AC-protocol) A
n AC-protocol
requirements:
Definition 33 (AC-protocol)
An
AC-protocol <P must sa.tisfy
satisfy the follo~uin,,q
following three requirements:
1. B
a s i c Security: Without
Without consideration of
of the verification
verification, process, <P
Q, satis,fies
1.
Basic
satisfies the secu.rity
security
of a SSMC-pro
SSMC-protocol
(a SMC-protocol secure
m,odel).
requirements of
taco l (a
seC1lre under the semi-hon,est
semi-honest model).

2. B
a s i c Structure:
S t r u c t u r e : The
The execution
execution, of
of <P
Q, consists of
of two
~ W Ophases:
2.
Basic

C o m p u t a t i o n phase: Compute
Com.pute the prescribed
injorn,ation needed
• Computation
prescribed function.ality
functionality and store infoT'mation
for the ver~fication
verz'fication process.
for
V e r i f i c a t i o n phase: A n honest
hon.est party
(we name such a pnrty
thereafter)
• Verification
party (we
party as a prover thereafter)
can succeed in verifying an accountable
accoun.table behavior.
3.
sound providin,g
providing that the veri.fication
fabricated
3. Sound
S o u n d Verification:
Verification: <P
Q, is soun,d
veri.fica.tion phase cannot be fabricated
party.
by a malicious pnrty.
phase, the
phase stated in Definition 3 is optional
Note that
tliat unlike the computation phase.
thc verification pliase
optioilal
AC-protocol. Details follow
follo\v later in the section.
for each run of an AC-protocol.
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3.1

General Assumptions

In
I11 this sub-section,
sub-section. we clarifv two
t ~ v okey assumptions
assuinptions adopted throughout
tllroughout the framework:
framenork: one is
t o the nature of involving entities,
entities. and the other concerns the number of malicious
inalicious parties
related to
allowed.
allowed.
3.1.1
3.1.1

Nature of Involving Entities

In the AC-framework
AC-framcn-ork. the involving entities consist
coilsist of both the
t,he verifier and participating parties,
~ n e a n sa party behaves either semi-honestly or maliciously under
u~lderthe context of this
t.his
and nature means
paper.
paper.
Verifier: In
I11 general,
general, we assume that there is one or a group of verifier(s)
verifier(s) and that
Nature of Verifier:
the verifier always
all\-ays behaves honestly
llo~lestlyduring the verification process. It
I t would not make sense to
inalicious verifier does not want to be convinced,
convinced. no one can
call
have a malicious verifier betause
because if the malicious
succeed in the verification process.
Parties: If
If a participating party is the verifier, we assume it is always
Nature of Participating Parties:
entit).. Other participating parties can be either semi-honest or malicious.
malicious.
an honest entity.
3.1.2
3.1.2

Bounds on the Number of Malicious Parties

cert.ain models,
nlodels. Sl\JC-protocols
SMC-protocols only exist
exist. when majority
inajorit,jr of participating parties are honest,
l~onest,~
For certain
2
aad some situations
sit,uat.ionsrequire a majority
inajorit,y of 3.
inerely consider two-party
two-part.y prot.ocols
and
For this paper,
paper, we merely
protocols
under the
t,he AC framework
framework, and we require at least
least, one of the
t,he 1.\vo
t.1~0participating parties is honest
honest. (or
semi-honest).
semi-honest).

l

3.2
3.2

SMC
AC-framework vs. SMC

lay out the essential
esseiltlal differences bet~veen
ShIC model. In general,
general,
Here we layout
between the AC-framework and the SIVIC
AC-protocols should be compared
hIShIC protocols on the following
followiilg criteria:
criteria: basic
coinpared with SSMC and l\lSl\lC
structure. security
securitj definitions and computation
coinput at ion complexity.
complexity.
structure,
3.2.1
3.2.1

Basic Structure
Structure

t.o Definition
Defiilit,ion 3,
3, the
t,he verification
verificat,ion phase along with
wit,h the accountable
accouiltable behavior are the
t,he key
According to
feat,ures that
t,l~atdistinguish
distiilguish the
t,he AC-framework from
froin the SMC
Sh4C model. A protocol that
that. satisfies
sat,isfies the ACfeatures
co1nput.e not only
oilly the
t,he correct
correct. results
result,s but,
infor~nationneeded
framework needs to compute
but also additional information
t.o verify the
t,he accountable
account,able behavior.
party to
for a part,y
addit.ion, the
t,he verification
verifica.t.ion phase is optional
opt,ional for each execution
execut.ion of an AC-protocol. The verIn addition,
ificat,ion process is performed merely
inerely when there
t,here is an accusation
accusa.t,ion that
that. a participat,ing
participating part,y
party did
ification
not. behave honestly
1 ~ o n e s t .regarding
l~
t,he accountable
account.able behavior and thus
t,hus may have obtained or disclosed
not
the
inforinat.ion which should not
not. be leaked if it
it. behaved semi-honestly.
semi-honestly. Verification
Verifica,tion allows the
t,he accused
information
part,jr
semi-honest. to prove its
it,s innocence.
party who is in fact semi-honest
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3.2.2
3.2.2

Security Definitions

Under
Uilder the SI\lC
ShlC model, the
t,lle security
securit,y definitions are generally based on two
t,~votypes
t,ypes of adversaries:
adversaries: semihonest and malicious. On the contrary,
contrary, the two adversary models are no longer relevant at
at. least
from the stand point of a verifier since we assume a verifier always behave semi-honestly as stated
in section 3.1.
3.1. Also, we do not enforce any
ally constraint
constraiilt on the behaviors of participating parties,
and they
t.hey can
call be either
eit,her semi-honest or malicious as long as they are not
not, verifiers. Furthermore,
Furthermore; it
it,
is inaccurate
inaccurat,e to assume a party whose actions
actioils need to be proved against
agaiilst the
t,he accountable
accouiltable behavior
semi-honest,. Therefore,
Therefore; security definitions
defiilitioils under the
t.he AC-framework do not
not. distinguish
dist.inguis11between
is semi-honest.
adversary.
a semi-honest adversary and a malicious adversary.
The AC-framework
AC-framen~orkis more flexible from its security point of view due to the rr component
coinponeilt stated
strated
Defiilitioil 2. Since the
t.he accountable behavior can
call be anything,
anyt,hing, the
t,he AC-framework
AC-fi-amework is generally
in Definition
t.han the
t,he SIVIC
SI\/IC model.
model.
more applicable than
3.2.3
3.2.3

Computation Complexity

coinputatioil complexity
complexit,y under the AC-framework is
Regardless various accountable behaviors, the computation
classified into
int.0 two phases: computation phase and verification
verificatioil phase. Computation
Coinputatioil phase is required
it, produces the
tlle expected
expect.ed result and all necessary information
informat.ion
for each run of the prot.0~01,
protocol, and it
needed for verification
verificat,ioil phase. Verification
Verificatioil process could be optional
optioilal for each run unless
uilless there
t,here is a
disput,e or an expected
expect,ed (or accountable) behavior needs to
t,o be verified.
dispute
The running
runiliilg time or complexity of an AC-protocol
AC-prot.0~01can
call be as (or possibly even more) inefficient
as
as a MSIVIC-protocol;
hdSh4C-protocol; however, the computation phase of an AC-protocol
AC-prot,ocol should be more
inore efficient
verificat,ion phase of the protocol is not
not. needed for every run.
run. If
If the complexity of the
because the verification
computation
coinputat,ioil phase of an AC-protocol were comparable to IVISlVIC-protocol,
h'ISMC-prot,ocol, the
t,he l\lSMC-protocol
hlSh4C-protocol
would be sufficient and more
practical purposes.
purposes. Therefore,
inore effective
effective than
t,han the AC-protocol
AC-prot,ocol for practica,l
Therefore: a
challenge in designing
desigiling an AC-protocol is to
t,o ensure that
t,llat the
t,he computation
colnputatioll phase is efficient.
efficient..

3.3

Guideline
Guideline for Designing AC-Protocol

Definit,ion 3,
3: we outline basic procedures that
t,hat. can be used to implement
implement. a prot,ocol
Based on Definition
protocol
under the
t . 1 AC-framework.
~
The key procedures highlighted
parts:
highlight,ed in Figure 11 consist
consist. of three
t,hree part,s:
behavior specification,
specification, computation phase and verification
verificat,ioil phase.
Behavior specification
specificat,ioil defines what
what. an expected or accountable
account,able behavior is and its
it.s related
coinpone11t.s. The implementation
ililplement,ation of the computation
computat.ioa phase is the
t,he same as that of a SSIVIC-protocol,
SSh4C-protocol;
components.
that. additional
addibional information
illformatioil needs to
t.o be computed for the
t.he verification
verificatioil phase. Steps
St,eps provided
except that
in the
t,he verification
verificat.ion phase serve as guidance for a verifier. It needs to
t,o be proven that a malicious
part.icipat.ing
t,lle verifier that
t,hat it behaved honestly during the computation
computat,ioil
participating party cannot convince the
protocol.
phase of the prot,ocol.
t,o the
t,he definitions
definit,ions and the guideline presented in this
t,llis section,
sect,ion, we proceed to present
According to
110~;an
811 actual data
dat.a mining task
talc can
call be implemented
impleinent,ed under the
t,he ACa case study that shows how
framework.
framework.
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1:
I:

Behavior Specification:
Specification:
• Define a verifiable
\:erifinble behavior:
• Specify
Specif:. its
its related components.
coinponent.~.
Computation
Comput at.ion Phase:
Phase:

2:
2:

• Design a protocol <P secure under the semi-honest
semi-lionest model:
• Compute
process, and ~nodify
modify
Compute all necessary
necessarv information
inforinatioil to
t o support a sound verification process.
<P accordingly.
accordingly.
3:
3: Verification
Verificatioil Phase:
Phase:

• State
what during t.he
the verificat.ion
verification process;
St.at,everification
verificat.ion procedures including who
\vho should do what,
information co~nputed
computed in the
• Prove that the
tlie verification procedures
procetlures along with additional inforinatio~~
computation phase constitute a sound vcrification
\~crificationprocess under Definition 3.
Figure 1:
AC-protocol
1: Guidelinc
Guideline for Designing an AC-prot.0~01

Case
(FFI)
Case Study:
Study: Finding Frequent Itemsets (FFI)

44

Several algorithms
association rule mining using the
algorit~hnlshave been developed for privacy-preserving
privacy-preserving associat,ioil
inultipart,y computation
comput.a.t.ion framework.
framenrork. Most
hIost are based on the Apriori algorithin
secure multiparty
algorithm [I];
[1]: the key
step is
is to
t o securely
securely compute
co1nput.e frequency
freqnency of a set
set, of candidate it,einsets
step
itemsets \vit,hout.
\'lithout disclosing each party's
party's
private
to use a secure dot product.
product prot,ocol.
protocol. I11
In t,his
this
privat.e dataset.
dat,aset,. One approach,
approach, suggested
suggest.ed in [7,21],
17: 211: is t,o
section, to
t.o deillonstrate
derqonst,rat.e the usefulness and applicability
app1icabilit.y of t.he
section,
the AC-framework, we first int.roduce
introduce
t,\vo-pal-t.gprotocol
prot,ocol to
t.o compute
comput,e frequent itemsets
it,einset.s under the seini-lionest
a secure two-party
semi-honest inodel
model proposed
proposed
in [7,
17, 21].
211. V,Te
\;lie then
t.hen show
sho117 how
h o ~ 7to
t,o modify such protocol into one t,llat
sat.isfies
t,he
AC-framework,
that satisfies the
allowiilg the
t,he semi-honest behavior to
t o be verified.
allowing

4.1
4.1

(SSMC-FFI)
FFI under the semi-honest model (SSMC-FFI)

T h e protocols
prot,ocols presented in [7,
[7, 21]
2:l.l are basically a secure dot.
The
dot product prot,ocol
protocol bet.ween
between t,wo
two vectors
ent,ries are either
eit.her 0 or 11 values.
values. Let VI,
Cl.V2
t$ be t,wo
2
two vectors wit.h
with size nz
TTl of
of parties P1
PI and P
P2
whose entries
respect,ively, and Vj
v'j [i]
[i]denotes
dei1ot.e~the
t,lie ii"'lh bit of 0.
Cj. Formally,
Forinally, define FFI(GI
respectively,
FFI(VI,: 52)
V2) --t
-----t 6,
0, where S0 =
= GI
VI • ti2.
V2.
Let E : R x X
X -----t
--t Y be a probabilistic public key encryption scheme, such as t,hose
those proposed
proposed
14, 13,
13. 16],
161; where R,
R , X and Yare
Y are finite
fii1it.e domains
doinains ident,ified
in [4,
identified \vit,h
with an initial subset.
subset of
of inbegers
integers
D :Y
Y -----t
--t X
X be a private
privat,e decryption
decrypt,ion algorithm,
algorit,hin, such t,l~at.
: D ( E ( r .x ) ) = x.
and D:
that V(r.
\7(1', xx)) E R xX X
X,D(E(1',X))
Furthermore. the
t,he scheme
sclleine has the
t,he following
follo\ving properties:
propert,ies:
Furthermore,
T h e encryption
encrypt ion function
fuilct~ioiiis injective
inject,ive with respect t,o
1. XXl).
I ) , (1-2,
2)
• The
to t.he
the second parameter, i.e.,
i.e., b'(r
\7(1'1,
(1'2. xX2)
E R x X,
X , E(1'I
E ( r l•..xd
x l )=
= E(T2,X2)
E ( r 2 , x 2 =}
) Xl
X I = x2
E
X2

*

Tlle encryption function is additive homomorphic,
hoinomorphic. i.e..
V(?-1
. Xl),
X I )((1'2,
.1 . 2 . X2)
22) E R x
• The
i.e., \7(1'1,
xX
X,.
n ( E ( r l x. 2 ) .E ( r 2 .x 2 ) )= E(1'3.XI
E(r3 X I + xX2),
2 ) .where 1'3
1.3 call
7-2.2.xI1 and 2X22
I1(E(1'I.X2).E(1'2,X2))
can be co~nputed
computed froin
from 1-1.
1'1,1'2,

+
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(n

in polynolnial
funct.ion to
t.o "add" two encrypted values:
values; multiplication
mult,iplicat.ion in the
polynomial time. (TI is the function
systems
svstems listed
lisbed above.)
above.)
[lo]. Informally
Inforlnally speaking,
speaking, a set
• The encryption function has semantic security as defined in [10].
of ciphertexts do not provide additional information
plaintext to an adversary with
inforlnation about the plaintext
polynomial-bounded computing
colnputing power.
power .

dolllaill and the range of the
t.he encryption
encrypt,ion system
syst,em is suitable.
suitable.
• The domain
st,eps of the
t,he FFI protocol are highlighted in Algorithm 1.
1. PI,
P I ; at step 1,
1; encrypts
encrypt,~individual
Key steps
Algorithm 11 FFI Protocol
Require: il],ih,E,
GI.C2.E. where
\vhere IVll
Ii&I =
= IV21
IC21 =
=m
m and E
E has certified public key paralnet.ers
Require:
parameters
I : PI:
PI:
1:

(a). Encrypt
Encrypt, Vl:
GI: xi
t E(1',
E(r:Vl
GI liD,
[i]),for i == 1,
1 ;...
. . . ,m;
: m;
(a).
Xi ~
T is randomly chosen for each Vl
6[i];
[i];
l'
(b). Sendxl,·.·,xmtoP2.
Send X I ; . . . . x,,, t.o P2.
(b).
2:

P2:

b+
n,,,,,il=l
xi;
(a).. Compute S
(a)
~ TI
ViAV2[i]=l Xi;
(b
). Send
(b).

S
8 to PI.
PI.

3: PI:
PI:
3:

~~
D((S)8
(a).. Compute 0
bt
(a)

)

(b). Send 0
b to
t,o P2.
P2.
(b).

n

it,s private vector
vect,or Vl and sends them to P2. At step 2(a),
2(a), the symbol TI indicates
indicat,es that
t.hat the
tlle
value in its
encrypt,ed vdi]
6[i] values are combined
colnbined to produce the encrypted dot product.
denot.ed by S;
8 ; the
t,he
encrypted
product value denoted
G2[i]
must. be 1.
1.
colnlnon characteristics
charact,erist,ics among all these values is that their corresponding V2
common
[i] values must
st,ep 3(a),
3(a), PI
P 1 computes
co1nput.e~the
tlle actual dot
dot. product value 0,
6;and PI
P 1 sends 0
b to
t,o P2 at the end.
end.
At step
t,o table
t,able 1 where
\vl~erea dataset
dat,aset is vertically part,it,ioned
P 1 and P2,
P2, and it
it. can be
Refer to
partitioned between PI
one-t.0-one join on the
tlle global identifier
ident.ifier attribute
at.tribute Tr#.
Tr#. Assume
Assunle PI
P 1 and P2 want
reconstructed via one-to-one
t,o know if {{abc)
frequent. itemset.
itemset. PI
P 1 first
first. creates
crea.t,esthe
t.he vector Vl
G1 =
=a
a'/\
g == (1(1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1)1) 1\/\
to
abc} is a frequent
1\ b
(0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 1)
1) =
= (0
(0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1),
I ) , where a,
a', b
g are the
t,he column vectors related to
t,o attribute
at,tribut,ea,
a,b
(000
of PI's
P l ' s dataset and 1\
A indicates the logic AND operator.
operat,or. P2 creates &V2
i =
= 15
c'=
(1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1).
= (1
1).
Aft,er applying the FFI protocol,
GI • V2
G2 == 3 without
wit,l~outdisclosing the privat,e
After
protocol, both parties get Vl
private vectors
Gl and V2
G2 to
tto each
ea,ch other.
ot.her. If
If the
t.he minimum
lninilnuln support is 2,
2; then
t,hen {abc}
{abc) is one of the frequent
frequent. itemsets.
itemsets.
VI
t,lle correctness
correct,ness and security analyses of the FFI protocol can be found in [7,
[7, 21].
211.
Details regarding the

4.2
4.2

Attacks on SSMC-FFI

Algoritlun 1 is secure under the semi-honest
semi-honest. adversary model,
model,
Since the FFI prot,ocol
protocol presented in Algorithm
t,wo vulnerabilities
vulnerabilit,ies under the
tlle malicious
lnalicious adversary model:
model:
it has two
9

Tablc 1:
1: PI
P1 and P2
P 2 's Data (left aml
and right
riglit respectively)
rcspcctively)
Table
Tr#

a

1

1
1
0
0
1
1
0
1
1

2
3
4
5

6
7

8
9

b
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1

Tr#
1
2

3
1

5
6
7
8
9

c
1
1
0
0
1
0
0
1
1

d
0
0
0
1
1
1
0
1
1

e
1
0

0
1
1
0
0
1
1

1.
after the FFI protocol is initiated:
1. Input modification
~nodificatio~l
initiated:

P 1 sends P2
P 2 incorrect
incorrect, final
final result.
result,.
2. PI
Although under the malicious model,
prevented, the
model, input
input. modification
modific.ation cannot be prevented:
t,lle input
input. should not
not,
be modified further
furt.ller once the
t,he prot.0~01
js initiated.
jnjt.iated. Any intentionally
iilt~cilt,ioilallymiscalculations
iniscalculatioils at step
st,ep 11 and
protocol is
t,o this issue.
issue. Therefore,
Therefore, under
u~lderthe AC-framework,
AC-fraine~vork,any
ally inconsistencies
illcoilsist~eilciesat
at. these
step 2 are related to
strepsshould
sholild be detected
det,ect.ed during the
t.he verification
verificat.io11phase.
two steps
P 1 receives the
t,he right
right. J
8 value
\ralue at
at. step 3(b),
3(b), PI
P 1 can send
seild P2
P 2 any value instead
addition: even if PI
In addition,
t.he actual 0
b value. As a result,
result; this malicious behavior should be detected under the
t,he framework
frainework
of the
whenever it happens.
Next section
happelis. Next.
sect,ioil shows how
110117 to change
chailge the
t.lle SSrvIC-FFI
SSAIIC-FFI protocol into
illto an AC-FFI
protocol whose verification
~lerificat~ion
phase is capable
capa.ble of detecting
det,ect,iilgthe two
t.wo malicious behaviors stated
stat,ed above
if they have ever occurred during the
t.he computation
coillput,at,ioil phase.

4.3
AC-Framework (AC-FFI)
(AC-FFI)
4.3 FFI under the AC-Franiework
illtroduciilg the AC-FFI protocol,
accouiltable behavior
Before introducing
protocol, we first define the accountable
with AC-FFI:

rrOx3
ax3 associated

Prevent. input modification
inodificatioil after
a.fter the initiation
iilit,iat,ioilof SSl\IC-FFI
SSAIC-FFI protocol;
• Prevent
protocol:

P1 from
froin sending
seildiilg an incorrect
illcorrect result
reslilt to
t,o P2
P 2 at the
t,he final
final step:
st,ep;
• Prevent PI
• a = Third-party;
vect,or and the
t,he final
final result
result, of AC-FFI can
call be
• p:
f3: a random perinut.at.ion
permutation of each private input vector
disclosed to
party verifier.
t.o the
t,he third
t.hird part.y
t,llat rraXo
t,he prevent.ion
an;r malicious behavior in the
t,he computation
comput,a,tioil phase of
of
Note that
axe implies the
prevention of any
t,he verification phase of AC-FFI needs to verify every step
st,ep in the
t,he computation
comput.at.ion
AC-FFI. Thus, the
phase.
Key steps of AC-FFI's computation
phase arc providcd
provided in Algorithm
protocol adopts
coinput.at.ion pllasc
Algorithin 2. The
T h e prot,ocol
ad0pt.s
signat,ure scheme denoted
deiloted by Sign
Sign (e.g.,
(e.g.. RSA [17])
[17]) which is used during the
t,he verification
a secure signature
process. In
I11 order to
t.o fit
fit. the
t.he domain
domaill of a digital signature
signa.ture scheme,
scheine, we also use a hash
has11 function
fuilct,ioil (e.g.,
(e.g.,
1151; I\ID5
AID5 [18])
[18]) to
t.o compute
co1nput.e the hash value of an intended
illtended message and then
t,heil sign the hash
SHA [15],
10

value
random permutation .7rir to prevent
value instead.
instead. \Ve
We also assume that both parties agree on a randoin
the
of the
the wrifier
verifier V
1' in Algorithm
Algorithi~i3 from
froin seeing the private inputs of both parties. Other parts of
computation
phase
are
identical
to
SSl\lC-FFI.
are
SSLlC-FFI.
computatioii

Algorithm
A l -g o r i t h m 2 AC-FFl
AC-FFI Protocol
Prot.0~01- Computation
Coinput~at.ionphase
Require:
certified public key parameters, Sign is
R e q u i r e : f'l.lh,
GI. ,C2.E,
E : Sign,
Sign. H,
H , where 111'
113111 =
= IV21
117~1=
= m,
m,:E
E has cert,ified
a secure
scc.111-esignature scheme
sclleine and H
H is a hash
has11 function
fuilct~ion
1:
- 7r(VI),
P2:
I : PI:
P I : v~
Gi tt
.ir(G):send [H(v~),SignpdH(v;.))]
[ H ( q ) :Signpl (H(f$))] to
t.o P2;
2:
P2:
2: P2:
(a).
H ( r ' j ) and SignpdH(v;.))
S i g n p l ( H ( q ) ) cannot be verified:
(a). Abort
A b o r t if H(v~)
(b). ~

t-

7r(V2), send [H(v~), Signp2(H(v~))] to PI:

3: PI:

(a).
(a). Abort
A b o r t if H(~)
H($) and SignP2(H(~))
Signp2(H($)) cannot
canilot be verified:

v;.:
q:

-

v;.q

(b).
Xi
( b ) . Encrypt
Enciypt
x, t - E(r,
E(r, [i]),
[i]).for i7 =
= I,
1.....
. . .,m:
nz:
)'?- is
is randomly
randomlv chosen
choseil for each v~
Ci [i]:
[i]:

(c)
(c).. Set X
X =
= Xl,
T I . .. ..
. . ,T
. :I,,
[X.Signp]
Signpl (H(X))]
(H( X ) ) ] ttoo P2.
m and send [X,
4: P2:

X and SignpI
Signpl (H(X))
(H(X))
(a). Abort
A b o r t if X
cannot be verified
(a).
Coinpute S6 t - n\]'iI\V~
JJVzA?';[tl=l
x11
(b). Compute
(b).
[i]=l Xi;
+

(c). Send [S.
[8.SignP2(H(S))]
~ i g n p (H
2 (8))] to
t.o PI,
PI.
(c).
5:
5:

Pl:
PI:

8 and SignP2(H(S))
s i g n p 2 ( ~ ( 8 ) cannot
canilot
)
be verified
(a). Abort
A b o r t if Sand
(a).
Con1put.e 06 t+~ ( 8 )
(b). Compute
(b).
- D(S)
(c). Send [0,
[6.Signp]
Signpl (H(o))]
(H(G))] to P2.
P2.
(c).
6:
6:

P2: Abort
A b o r t if 06 and SignpI
Signpl (H(o))
( H ( 6 ) ) cannot
cannot, be verified
P2:

Tlle verification
\7erification phase
pliase of AC-FFI is presented in algorithm
a,lgorithm 3. T
h e verificatioil
The
The
verification phase is basically
basically
reconstruct,ioil of what
what. actually
act.ually occurred during t,he
comput.at.ion
phase
by
using
the
permuted
a reconstruction
the computation
permuted
i11put.s and messages
inessages sent during the
t,he computation
coinputation phase. Steps 1 and 2 in algoritllin
inputs
algorithm 3 require P
PI1
P 2 to
t,o send the
t,he messages they received during the computation phase.
and P2
st,ep 3,
3. the
t.he verifier examines
exainines (via
(via (a),
( a ) , (c)
(c) and (e))
(e)) if every message P
At step
PI1 sent is valid and
( b ) and (d))
( d ) ) if PI
P 1 correctly
correct,ly performed every required computat.ion.
exainines (via
(via (b)
examines
computation. Because P
PI1 is
required to
t.o send
seild three
hhree messages
inessages and
aad to
t.o perform t.wo
coinputat.ioi~s,
t.he
t.asks
conducted
by
the
two computations, the tasks
st.ep 3 is
is complete in validating
validat,ing PI's
P l ' s behavior. The iinpleineilt,atioil
verifier at step
implementation of
of step 4 follows the
same reasoning
reasoniilg in validating P2's behavior,
behavior, and consequently,
consequent,ly, we say that the verification
same
verification phase is
11

Algorithm 3 AC-FFI protocol: Verification phase
Require: H,
H: E,
E: where Hand
H aad E
E are
a.re used in the
t.he computation
cornput.at.ion phase
Require:
P1: send 11"1
Ipl =
= IV;,
[$; Sign1"2(H(t;)),
SignP2(H( 4 ) ) : J,
9;Sign1"2(H(J))]
s ~ ~ I z ~ ~ ( Hand
( ~D) )(decryption
(decrypt,ion
]
t.o the
t,he verifier V:
V:
1: PI:
key) to
P2: send 11"2
Ip2== [t;, Sign1"1
Signpl (H(V;)),
( ~ ( 4 ) )X
Signpl (H(X)),
( H ( X ) ) ;b,
6; Sign1"1
Signpl (H(b))]
(H(b))] to
t o V:
V;
2: P2:
X,:, Sign1"1
3: When P2 is honest,
honest,, V can catch PI
P1 cheating if:
if:

[4.

q

(a).
(a). V; and SignpdH(V;))
Signpl ( H( q )) are not
not. consistent:
consist.ent;

(b). D(X)
D ( X ) =1=
# vi;
i7;;
(b).
(c). X and Signp1
Sign.pl (H(X))
( H ( X ) ) are not consistent;
(c).
~ ( 8 =1=
#) 6:
b:
(d). D(J)
(d).
(e). bband
and Signp1
Sign.pl(H(6))
consistent..
(e).
(H(b)) are not consistent.
4:
4:

IVhen PI
P1 is honest,
honest,, V can catch
cat,ch P2 cheating
cheat,iilg if:
\iVhen
(a). t;
i$ and Signp2(H(~))
SignP2(H(i&))are not consistent;
consistent^;
(a).

(b). D(J)
(c).
(c).

J8 and

=1=

V; .~:

signp2(H (8)) are not consistent.
Sign1"2(H(J))

comp1et.e regarding rI?,,ox3.
3.
complete
4.3.1
4.3.1

Security and Soundness
Soundness of AC-FFI

T h e key difference between SSMC-FFI
SSI\/IC-FFI and AC-FFl's
AC-FFI's computation
coinputatioil phase is that the messages
inessages PI
P1
The
and P2 receive in AC-FFI contain
but the
coiltain additional signatures,
signat,ures, but.
t,he signatures do not convey any more
t.hemselves. Therefore,
Therefore; the
t.he security
securit,y analysis
ailalysis of AC-FFI is the same
information than the messages themselves.
as that
of
SSMC-FFI,
refer
to
[7,
21]
for
more
details.
Next,
we
show
that
that. SSIVIC-FFI,
t,o [7; 211
Next.,
t,hat the
t,he verification
verificatioil phase of
AC-FFI is sound.
sound.
veri.fication phase of
of AC-FFI
(defin.ition 3) provided that one of
of the two
Claim 11 The verification
A C- FFI is sound (definition
parties is honest and the verzfication
ver~fication phase is complete in verifying the accountable behavior r 0 x 3
associated with A
AC-FFI.
C-FFI.

PROOF.Since we have showed that the verification phase is complete, to
t o prove this claim,
claim, we only
PROOF.
t o show
sho~vany
ally malicious
inalicious behavior can
ca,n be detected as long as one party is honest.
honest. First,
First., suppose
need to
P2 is honest.
honest.. Then the
t.he verifier is certain
cert,ain that 11"2
Ip2is legitimate.
legitimat,e. Based on the three signatures
signat.ures
coiltailled in 11"2,
IP2;the verifier can determine (through steps
st.eps 3(a),3(c)
3(a),3(c) and 3(e)
3(e) in algorithm
algoritllin 3)
3) the
contained
valic1it.y of V; in 11"1
Ipl and two messages
inessages that
t,hat PI
P1 sent
sent. at
a t steps
st.eps 3(c)
3(c) and 5(c)
5(c) in the computation
colnputat.ioil phase
validity
(algorit,hm 2).
(algorithm
t,he verifier confirms
coilfirins vi
'lti in
ill 11"1
Iplis legitimate,
1egitiinat.e: the
t,he verifier (using
(using the decryption key D at step
st.ep
Once the
algorit,hin 3)
3) can determine
det,eriniile if X
~ v a scomputed correctly at
at. step 3(b)
3(b) in the computation
3(c) in algorithm
3(c)
X was
phase. If
If anything is inconsistent,
inconsist.ent,,either
eit.her D is the incorrect
incorrect. key or PI
P1 did not
not. encrypt
encrypt. vi
GIl properly.
t,he verifier can
call catch
cat,cll PI
P1 cheating. After this, the
t,lle verifier can
call confirm whether or not
way, the
Either way,
12

D
D is valid, and consequently,
consequent.lj~,the verifier can confirm
coilfirin the
t,he validity
validit*yof the calculation at step 5(b)
5(b) in
algorit.hin 2.
algorithm
The
Tlle above analyses show
sho\v a complete
comp1et.e reconstruction of what
xvhat PI
P1 actually
act.ual1y did in the
t.he computation
comput.ation
phase. Since P2 is honest,
honest., any inconsistency
iilcoilsisteilcy in the
t.he reconstruction
reconst.ruction process leads to the fact that
t,hat P2
t,he computation
coinputatioil phase.
Therefore, PI
P1 cannot mislead the
t,he verifier
did behave maliciously during the
phase. Therefore,
in the verification
verifica.tion phase as long as P2 is honest.
honest,. On the
t,he other hand,
hand, if PI
P1 is honest,
honest, based on the
reasoning: P2 cannot
cannot, mislead the
t,he verifier either.
either. \Ve
TVe can conclude that the
t,he verification
verificat.ion phase
same reasoning,
[7
sound. 0
of AC-FFI is sound.

Note that
t,llat for the
t.he verification
verificat,ion phase, we did not consider
coilsider the
t,he situation
sit,uation where the protocol
t.er1ninat.e~
preinat.urely.
abort.ing of a prot,ocol
inany factors
fa.ct,ors
terminates
prematurely. The aborting
protocol is a very complex issue because many
could be involved.
involved. It would be very interesting
int.erest,ing to
t.o design a verification process that handles such
sit,uat,ions.
situations.
4.3.2
4.3.2

Advantages of AC-FFI

So far,
far, \ve
we have provided a real-life application
applicat,ioil that
t.hat. shows
shoxvs the promise of the AC-framework.
Comparing
protocol, the computation
Coinpariilg to the SSrvIC-FFI
SSi\;IC-FFI protocol,
coillput,at,ioilphase of the AC-FFI protocol additionally
addit,ioilally
t,o compute
coillput,e 5 hash values and 5 digital signatures,
signat.ures, but these calculations
calculat,ioils are
a.re negligible.
negligible. The
needs to
has11 cost
cost, is based on the
t,he size of the vector,
vector, but.
t,o the
t.l~ecost
cost. of
hash
but it is a very small cost compared to
homomorphic
hoinoinorphic encryption
encrypt,ion (which
(xvhich must
must. also be applied to
t,o each item in the vector).
vector). The cost
cost. of aa.
sigilat.ure is comparable
coinparable to
t.o the cost of an individual
iildividual encryption
eilcryptioil because it
it. is applied to the hash
signature
value whose size is constant.
tot.al cost of the protocol remains dominated
doininat.ed by the cost
constant.. Thus the total
l~oinoinorpl~ically
encrypt.ing the vectors,
vect,ors, and it is not appreciably greater than that
that. of SSI'vICSSA/lCof homomorphically
encrypting
FFI. In
phase, the
protocol inherits
I11 addition,
addition, because of a sound verification
verificat.ion phase:
t.he AC-FFI prot.0~01
in11erit.s significant
significailt
advant,age over the
t.he SSlVIC-FFI
SSAJC-FFI prot,ocol
enforciilg honest
honest. behaviors.
advantage
protocol in enforcing
furt.her confirms
confirins our intuition:
int.uit,ion: the computation
coinputatioil phase of an AC-protocol
AC-prot.0~01
The AC-FFI prot,ocol
protocol further
efficient. as a SSl\lC-protocol.
SSA?C-prot,ocol. Furthermore,
Furthermore: since malicious
inalicious behavior can
call be detected by
call be as efficient
can
verificatioil process, the
t.he verification
verificat,ioil phase provides part.icipating
t,he incentive to follow
follow
the verification
participating parties the
t.he prot,ocol
correct,ly; in other
ot,her words,
words, part.icipat.ing
inore likely to
t,o output
out,put the
t,he correct
the
protocol correctly:
participating partries
parties are more
t,he AC-framework
AC-fra.ine\vork than
t,llan does a SMC-protocol
SAsIC-prot.0~01
inodel.
result, under the
result
secure under the semi-honest model.

5

Conclusion // Future Work

Confident.ialit;vis an extremely important
iinport.ant issue in data security. Even when different
different. data holders
Confidentiality
alloxved to
t,o see each other's
ot,her's data, they may
inay not choose to do so when they
t,hey collaborate
collaborat,e to achieve
achieve
are allowed
aa common
coininon goal because they
t.hey do not
not. want to get
get, accused that they
t,hey are the
t,he ones to
t.o disclose
disclose certain
confident,ial information.
inforinat,ion. In
I11 this paper,
(AC) framework
confidential
paper, we present.
present the accountable computing (AC)
that allows
alloxvs an
a,n honest
honest. party to prove innocence
innoceilce to
t.o aa. third independent entity
entitry when
wheil it
it. has
llas followed
followed
a prot,ocol
protocol correctly. Such a framework has much pot,eilt,ial
potential in practice since it
it. provides more
iilceiltives for aa, part.y
incentives
party to behave honestly.
A SSMC-protocol,
SSA!IC-prot,ocol, if followed,
follo\ved, prevents information
inforinat.ion disclosure. However,
However, it
it. may
inay be possible
dishonest. part,y
t,o undetectably
undet,ectably cause disclosure by not
not. following
following the protocol correctly.
correct.1~.At
At.
for a dishonest
party to
the
t.he other
ot,her end of the
t,he spectrum,
spectrum, a protocol secure under the
t,he malicious model
inodel definitely
definit,ely erases these
t,hese
securit.y concerns.
concerns. Nevert,heless,
efficient malicious
inalicious prot,ocols
difficult, to
t,o design.
design. The
security
Nevertheless, efficient
protocols appear to be difficult
it,s general structure
st,ruct,ureallows
allows possible design of more
inore
verifiability, and its
AC-framework provides a party verifiability,
13

t,he malicious
inalicious model because the verification
verificatioil process does not need to
t o be
efficient prot,ocols
protocols than the
execut,ioil of an AC-protocol.
AC-protocol.
carried out during the execution
st.ate the penalty related
relat,ed to
t o the
t.lle detection
detectioil of
Under the AC-framework, we do not explicitly state
t,he verification phase. In
I11 practice, this
t.his can be addressed through
througli conmalicious behaviors in the
tract. signing,
signing: and before using any AC-protocol, both part,ies
tract
parties should agree on the penalty should
malicious
inalicious behavior be detected.
I11 the
t,he paper, we also presented a secure finding frequent
frequent. itemsets
iteinsets protocol that
tliat meets
nleet,s the
In
T h e protocol is nearly as efficient as its
it,s counterpart
coui~terpartin the
t,he
definitions
defiilitioils of the AC-frame- work. The
Ail honest
honest. participating party can
call verify its
it,s honesty to a third
t,l~irdentity.
ent,it,y. The
The
semi-honest model. An
verificatioil process is very limited to
t,o the
t , l ~ efact that
t,l~at.the verifier only sees the
disclosure in the verification
perinut,ed
coinputat,ions performed arc
are based on the
t.he permuted
input,s as well.
n~ell.
permuted inputs and all the computations
perrnuted inputs
iilcludes prot,ocols
t , l ~ aare
t efficient at computation
coinputat~ion
Future work includes
protocols supporting zero-knowledge proofs that
time (although
(alt.houg11 perhaps expensive to verify).
verify). In
I11 addition,
addit,ioil, as
a.s mentioned
ineilt,ioned previously, better dealing
1vit11 preina,ture
t,erinina,t,ionof an AC-protocol would be also very interesting
int.erest.iilg for future
fut,ure research.
research.
with
premature termination
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